Evidence record 4994 · automatically gathered

MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets

Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice and labor market clearing. In practice, however, these markets are invariably governed by complex distributional constraints, ranging from diversity quotas and regional balance to global capacity slacks, under which stable matchings often fail to exist. This rai

Record details

Published: 4 May 2026
Source: arXiv
Category: Research
Topics: Jobs & economy · Children & education
Retrieved: 14 July 2026

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ethics.ai (4 May 2026), “MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets,” evidence record 4994, https://ethics.ai/record/4994 (originally published by arXiv).

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