{
  "id": 4994,
  "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.03216v1",
  "title": "MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets",
  "summary": "Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice and labor market clearing. In practice, however, these markets are invariably governed by complex distributional constraints, ranging from diversity quotas and regional balance to global capacity slacks, under which stable matchings often fail to exist. This rai",
  "authors": "Zhaohong Sun, Makoto Yokoo",
  "category": "research",
  "topics": "jobs-economy,children-education",
  "orgs": null,
  "regions": null,
  "published_at": "2026-05-04T23:12:08.000Z",
  "fetched_at": "2026-07-14T16:31:26.334Z",
  "source_slug": "arxiv-ethics",
  "source_name": "arXiv",
  "source_homepage": "https://arxiv.org",
  "ethics_ai_record_url": "https://ethics.ai/record/4994",
  "original_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.03216v1",
  "evidence_status": "source-only",
  "attribution": "via ethics.ai"
}