The Governance Inversion Hypothesis: Why More AI Regulation May Produce Less Organisational Control
This paper introduces the Governance Inversion Hypothesis (GIH) to explain a growing paradox in artificial intelligence (AI) governance: under conditions of increasing regulatory expansion and technological complexity, organisations may become more formally governed while simultaneously experiencing a decline in operational control over AI systems. Existing AI governance frameworks generally assume that stronger regulation improves accountability, oversight, and organisational control. This pape
Record details
Published: 23 May 2026
Source: arXiv
Category: Research
Topics: Regulation · Transparency
Retrieved: 14 July 2026
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ethics.ai (23 May 2026), “The Governance Inversion Hypothesis: Why More AI Regulation May Produce Less Organisational Control,” evidence record 3806, https://ethics.ai/record/3806 (originally published by arXiv).
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