Evidence record 17347 · automatically gathered

Hardware Keystores for AI Agent Signing Workflows: A Zero-Trust MCP Enforcement Architecture

AI agents performing cryptographic operations (signing Git commits, authenticating API calls, issuing certificates) currently store private keys in software-accessible locations: plaintext files, environment variables, or container memory. Any process with sufficient read privileges can extract the raw key material. A recent production incident demonstrated the practical severity: private keys were exfiltrated from a widely deployed framework via email injection in under five minutes. We aim to

Record details

Published: 6 August 2026
Source: arXiv cs.AI
Category: Research
Topics: Agents & autonomy · Environment
Retrieved: 7 August 2026

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ethics.ai (6 August 2026), “Hardware Keystores for AI Agent Signing Workflows: A Zero-Trust MCP Enforcement Architecture,” evidence record 17347, https://ethics.ai/record/17347 (originally published by arXiv cs.AI).

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