Evidence record 741 · automatically gathered

Quantifying Theoretical AI Alignment Guarantees: Receiver-Utility Bounds in Bayesian Persuasion

Misalignment can change how information moves from an AI agent to a human user. We model this as an information advantage: the AI agent observes the world state, while the human receiver only knows a prior and must act after seeing the agent's signal. A strategic AI sender may withhold evidence or garble information in order to steer the human's decision. We ask how much useful information can still reach the human when the AI optimizes a misaligned objective. We study a Bayesian persuasion mode

Record details

Published: 20 June 2026
Source: arXiv
Category: Research
Topics: Safety & alignment · Agents & autonomy
Retrieved: 14 July 2026

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ethics.ai (20 June 2026), “Quantifying Theoretical AI Alignment Guarantees: Receiver-Utility Bounds in Bayesian Persuasion,” evidence record 741, https://ethics.ai/record/741 (originally published by arXiv).

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