Evidence record 16166 · automatically gathered

Salami Attack: Stealthy Collusive Memory Poisoning against OpenClaw

Long-term memory enables LLM agents to retain useful information across sessions, but also creates an attack surface through which adversaries may poison an agent's persistent memory to steer its behavior. Existing memory poisoning attacks mainly rely on individually malicious records, overlooking a compositional threat: multiple benign-looking memories may jointly induce unsafe behavior. In this paper, we introduce MemCollusion, an automated red-teaming framework for constructing collusive memo

Record details

Published: 3 August 2026
Source: arXiv red teaming query
Category: Research
Topics: Safety & alignment · Agents & autonomy
Retrieved: 4 August 2026

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ethics.ai (3 August 2026), “Salami Attack: Stealthy Collusive Memory Poisoning against OpenClaw,” evidence record 16166, https://ethics.ai/record/16166 (originally published by arXiv red teaming query).

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