Multiscale Exit-Join Dynamics: Tactical Consensus and Strategic Coalition Formation
This paper develops a multiscale model of coalition formation in which strategic exit-and-join decisions are coupled with tactical consensus dynamics inside coalitions. Coalition value is generated endogenously from within-coalition information aggregation, while Aumann-Dreze payoffs, switching frictions, and acceptance rules govern strategic reconfiguration. The framework introduces a fast-slow architecture in which transferable coalition value emerges from DeGroot-style consensus processes, wh
Record details
Published: 19 June 2026
Source: arXiv
Category: Research
Topics: unclassified
Retrieved: 14 July 2026
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ethics.ai (19 June 2026), “Multiscale Exit-Join Dynamics: Tactical Consensus and Strategic Coalition Formation,” evidence record 780, https://ethics.ai/record/780 (originally published by arXiv).
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