Evidence record 3131 · automatically gathered

Formal Mechanisms for Market Stability in Self-Interested Agent Societies: A Marketplace Simulation Study

Self-interested agents, left unconstrained, tend toward defection in repeated social dilemmas, causing cooperative gains from trade to collapse. This paper investigates what formal mechanisms, layered on top of unrestricted communication, are sufficient for a society of such agents to maintain market stability, and how resilient those mechanisms are to adversarial attack. We instantiate the research question as a multi-agent marketplace simulation where 18 LLM agents (DeepSeek-V3) with complemen

Record details

Published: 9 July 2026
Source: arXiv red teaming query
Category: Research
Topics: Agents & autonomy · Finance, VC & PE
Retrieved: 14 July 2026

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ethics.ai (9 July 2026), “Formal Mechanisms for Market Stability in Self-Interested Agent Societies: A Marketplace Simulation Study,” evidence record 3131, https://ethics.ai/record/3131 (originally published by arXiv red teaming query).

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