Evidence record 15230 · automatically gathered

One Human, $N$ Agents: Audit-Budget Allocation for LLM Agent Fleets under Miscalibrated, Correlated Confidence

A single human must audit $N$ LLM agents under a budget of $B \ll N$ audits per round, guided by self-reported confidence that may be adversarially miscalibrated and by correlated errors. We model this as budgeted noisy inspection over a two-level Gaussian copula and locate the miscalibration threshold $δ^*$ past which confidence-ranked auditing is \emph{worse} than random. Two a-priori expectations reverse: $δ^*$ \emph{rises} as the budget shrinks, and cross-family correlation is not low---shar

Record details

Published: 30 July 2026
Source: arXiv cs.AI
Category: Research
Topics: Agents & autonomy · Transparency
Retrieved: 31 July 2026

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ethics.ai (30 July 2026), “One Human, $N$ Agents: Audit-Budget Allocation for LLM Agent Fleets under Miscalibrated, Correlated Confidence,” evidence record 15230, https://ethics.ai/record/15230 (originally published by arXiv cs.AI).

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