Evidence record 11622 · automatically gathered

Breaking Refusal in the First Half: A Mechanistic Study of the Prefill Jailbreak

Aligned language models refuse harmful requests, but a one-line prefill ("Sure, here is") strips the refusal. We ask where and how it fails. The harm representation stays intact: on the prompts the attack flips to compliance, a linear probe reads harm as high as on the refused ones (0.91-0.98), while behavioral refusal drops to chance. This holds across four models and three families (1.5-3.8B, and at 14B). Refusal is therefore a shallow, response-site computation. We localize it to an early win

Record details

Published: 14 July 2026
Source: arXiv red teaming query
Category: Research
Topics: Regulation · Safety & alignment
Retrieved: 18 July 2026

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ethics.ai (14 July 2026), “Breaking Refusal in the First Half: A Mechanistic Study of the Prefill Jailbreak,” evidence record 11622, https://ethics.ai/record/11622 (originally published by arXiv red teaming query).

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