{
  "id": 16273,
  "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03670v1",
  "title": "Accountability Asymmetry and Structural Trust in Autonomous AI Systems",
  "summary": "Autonomous AI systems (such as AI agents) are increasingly being delegated operational work across scientific-computing infrastructure. Their assignments may begin with preparing an input or routing an alert and extend to changing a configuration or submitting a job. That delegation creates a practical trust problem because the institutional logic that lets us trust human operators does not transfer to optimization-based systems. A bad decision can damage a human operator's future, sometimes sev",
  "authors": "Nathan DeBardeleben",
  "category": "research",
  "topics": "jobs-economy,agents-autonomy,transparency",
  "orgs": null,
  "regions": null,
  "published_at": "2026-08-04T13:47:54.000Z",
  "fetched_at": "2026-08-05T05:10:44.550Z",
  "source_slug": "arxiv-ethics",
  "source_name": "arXiv",
  "source_homepage": "https://arxiv.org",
  "ethics_ai_record_url": "https://ethics.ai/record/16273",
  "original_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03670v1",
  "evidence_status": "source-only",
  "attribution": "via ethics.ai"
}