{
  "id": 16192,
  "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03670",
  "title": "Accountability Asymmetry and Structural Trust in Autonomous AI Systems",
  "summary": "arXiv:2608.03670v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous AI systems (such as AI agents) are increasingly being delegated operational work across scientific-computing infrastructure. Their assignments may begin with preparing an input or routing an alert and extend to changing a configuration or submitting a job. That delegation creates a practical trust problem because the institutional logic that lets us trust human operators does not transfer to optimization-based systems. A bad decision can",
  "authors": "Nathan DeBardeleben",
  "category": "research",
  "topics": "jobs-economy,agents-autonomy,transparency",
  "orgs": null,
  "regions": null,
  "published_at": "2026-08-05T04:00:00.000Z",
  "fetched_at": "2026-08-05T05:10:44.550Z",
  "source_slug": "arxiv-cscy",
  "source_name": "arXiv cs.CY",
  "source_homepage": "https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CY/recent",
  "ethics_ai_record_url": "https://ethics.ai/record/16192",
  "original_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03670",
  "evidence_status": "source-only",
  "attribution": "via ethics.ai"
}