{
  "id": 14464,
  "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.23310v1",
  "title": "Online Fair Division with Budget Constraints",
  "summary": "We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints. Goods arrive one at a time and must be assigned irrevocably to a feasible agent or to charity, which holds all unallocated goods, while fairness is evaluated only against budget-feasible subsets of every recipient's bundle. We first show that, without additional structure, no deterministic online algorithm can guarantee any fixed approximation to feasible envy-freeness, even in highly symmetric",
  "authors": "Saar Cohen, Nicholas Teh, Paul W. Goldberg, Michael J. Wooldridge",
  "category": "research",
  "topics": "bias-fairness,agents-autonomy",
  "orgs": null,
  "regions": null,
  "published_at": "2026-07-25T17:53:10.000Z",
  "fetched_at": "2026-07-29T05:10:12.205Z",
  "source_slug": "x-arxiv-fairness-query",
  "source_name": "arXiv fairness query",
  "source_homepage": "https://arxiv.org",
  "ethics_ai_record_url": "https://ethics.ai/record/14464",
  "original_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.23310v1",
  "evidence_status": "source-only",
  "attribution": "via ethics.ai"
}