{
  "id": 11958,
  "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.01730",
  "title": "Resilient Liquid Democracy: Mitigating Voting Power Imbalances via Secure Delegation Networks",
  "summary": "arXiv:2607.01730v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Liquid democracy lets voters either vote directly or delegate their voting power to a trusted participant. Existing deployments make delegations publicly visible as they form, which invites popularity-driven herding, makes coercion verifiable, and leaves the election fragile when highly backed delegates abstain. We propose a liquid democracy mechanism that removes these vulnerabilities while keeping the tally fully auditable. Delegation c",
  "authors": "Zhuolun Li, Evangelos Pournaras",
  "category": "research",
  "topics": "misinformation,transparency",
  "orgs": null,
  "regions": null,
  "published_at": "2026-07-21T04:00:00.000Z",
  "fetched_at": "2026-07-21T05:10:12.656Z",
  "source_slug": "arxiv-cscy",
  "source_name": "arXiv cs.CY",
  "source_homepage": "https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CY/recent",
  "ethics_ai_record_url": "https://ethics.ai/record/11958",
  "original_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.01730",
  "evidence_status": "source-only",
  "attribution": "via ethics.ai"
}