{
  "id": 11765,
  "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15883v1",
  "title": "Perceived AGI: Believability as Dimensional Completeness, Not Capability",
  "summary": "Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind. We hypothesize that a central missing ingredient is not more capability but dimensional completeness. We propose that the believability of an artificial interlocutor -- the degree to which a user attributes an inner life to it, which we call perceived mind -- is governed by whether the agent expresses a small set of firs",
  "authors": "Sebastian Cochinescu",
  "category": "research",
  "topics": "agents-autonomy",
  "orgs": null,
  "regions": null,
  "published_at": "2026-07-17T11:57:46.000Z",
  "fetched_at": "2026-07-20T05:10:09.534Z",
  "source_slug": "arxiv-ethics",
  "source_name": "arXiv",
  "source_homepage": "https://arxiv.org",
  "ethics_ai_record_url": "https://ethics.ai/record/11765",
  "original_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15883v1",
  "evidence_status": "source-only",
  "attribution": "via ethics.ai"
}